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• Operating systems separate system into 
user land and kernel land
• Kernel and driver components run with 
elevated privileges
• Compromising of such a component: 
• How to protect these critical 
components?
• Alternative to detection: try to prevent
malicious programs from being executed
• Focus on latter approach
Motivation (1)
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Motivation (2)
• Traditional approach followed by NICKLE and SecVisor
• Lifetime kernel code integrity (instruction level)
– No overwriting of existing code
– No injection of new code
• Attacker model
– May own everything in user land (admin/root privileges)
– Vulnerabilities in kernel components are allowed
• Common assumption: an attacker must always execute own
code
• Can attacker carry out arbitrary computations nevertheless?
– Is it possible to create a real rootkit by code-reuse?
– Show how to bypass code integrity protections
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Return-Oriented Programming
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• Extension of infamous 
return-to-libc attack
• Controlling the stack
is sufficient to perform 
arbitrary control-flow 
modifications
• Idea: find enough 
useful instruction 
sequences to allow 
for arbitrary 
computations
…
ret. addr. (A)
ret. addr. (B)
ret. addr. (C)
…
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Overview
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Framework
• Problems attackers face:
– Varying environments: different codebase (driver & OS 
versions, etc.)
– Complex task: how to implement return-oriented tasks in an 
abstract manner?
• Facilitate development of complex return-oriented code
• Three core components:
1. Constructor
2. Compiler
3. Loader
• Currently supports 32bit Windows operating systems running IA-32
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Framework Overview
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Constructor
ntoskrnl.exe
hal.dll
win32k.sys
ntfs.sys
…
Useful Instruction
Sequences Gadgets
Compiler
Source Code
Return-Oriented
Program
Loader
Exploit
Codebase (PE Files)
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Useful Instruction Sequences
<instruction 1>
…
<instruction n>
ret
Example:
mov eax, [ecx]
add eax, edx
ret
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• Definition: instruction sequence that ends with 
a return
• How many instructions preceding a return 
should be considered?
 Must take side-effects into account
 Simplifying assumption: only consider one
preceding instruction
• Which registers may be altered?
 Only eax, ecx, and edx
• Not turned out to be problematic (see 
evaluation)
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Gadget Example (AND)
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pop ecx | R: ntoskrnl.exe:D88B
| L: <RightSource>-124
mov edx, [ecx+0x7c] | R: ntoskrnl.exe:C7B4C
pop eax | R: ntoskrnl.exe:B0AE
| L: <LeftSource>
mov eax, [eax]      | R: ntoskrnl.exe:B13E
and eax, edx | R: win32k.sys:ADAE6
pop ecx | R: ntoskrnl.exe:D88B
| L: <Destination>
mov [ecx], eax | R: ntoskrnl.exe:45E4
pop ecx
ret
mov edx, [ecx+0x7c]
ret
pop eax
ret
mov eax, [eax]
ret
and eax, edx
ret
mov [ecx], eax
ret
Codebase
AND Gadget
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Compiler
• Entirely self-crafted programming language
– Syntax similar to C
– All standard logical, arithmetic, and bitwise operations
– Conditions/looping with arbitrary nesting and subroutines
– Support for integers, char arrays, and structures (variable 
containers)
– Support for calling external, non return-oriented code
• Produces position-independent stack allocation of the program
• Program is contained in linear address region
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Loader
• Retrieves base addresses of the kernel and all loaded kernel 
modules (EnumDeviceDrivers)
• ASLR useless
• Resolves relative to absolute addresses
• Implemented as library
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Useful Instructions / Gadget Construction
• Tested Constructor on 10 different machines running different 
Windows versions (2003 Server, XP, and Vista)
• Full codebase and kernel + Win32 subsystem only (res.)
• Codebase always sufficient to construct all necessary gadgets
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Machine configuration # ret instr. # ret instr. (res)
Native / XP SP2 118,154 22,398
Native / XP SP3 95,809 22,076
VMware / XP SP3 58,933 22,076
VMware / 2003 Server SP2 61,080 23,181
Native / Vista SP1 181,138 30,922
Bootcamp / Vista SP1 177,778 30,922
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Runtime Overhead
• Implementation of two identical quicksort programs
• Return-oriented vs. C (no optimizations)
• Sort 500,000 random integers
• Average slowdown by factor of ~135
14
University of Mannheim, Germany
Laboratory for Dependable Distributed Systems
USENIX Security Symposium ’09
Overview
15
 Motivation
 Automating Return-Oriented Programming
 Evaluation
 Rootkit Example
 Conclusion
University of Mannheim, Germany
Laboratory for Dependable Distributed Systems
USENIX Security Symposium ’09
Rootkit Implementation
• Traverses process list and removes specific process
• 6KB in size
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int ProcessName;
int ListStartOffset = &CurrentProcess->process_list.Flink - CurrentProcess;
int ListStart = &CurrentProcess->process_list.Flink;
int ListCurrent = *ListStart;
while(ListCurrent != ListStart) {
struct EPROCESS *NextProcess = ListCurrent - ListStartOffset;
if(RtlCompareMemory(NextProcess->ImageName, "Ghost.exe", 9) == 9) { break; }
ListCurrent = *ListCurrent;
}
struct EPROCESS *GhostProcess = ListCurrent - ListStartOffset;
GhostProcess->process_list.Blink->Flink = GhostProcess->process_list.Flink;  
GhostProcess->process_list.Flink->Blink = GhostProcess->process_list.Blink;  
GhostProcess->process_list.Flink = ListCurrent; 
GhostProcess->process_list.Blink = ListCurrent; 
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Conclusion
• Return-oriented attacks against the kernel are possible
• Automated gadget construction
• Problem is malicious computation, not malicious code
• Code integrity itself is not enough
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Questions?
Thank you for your attention
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2nd Rootkit
• Allows hiding of arbitrary network socket connections
• Hooks into tcpip.sys control flow
• Concurrency is the natural enemy of return-oriented programming
– Overcome synchronization issues
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Return-Oriented Programming
• Introduced recently by Shacham
et al. [CCS07, CCS08, EVT09]
• Extension of infamous return-
to-libc attack
• Controlling the stack is sufficient 
to perform arbitrary control-flow 
modifications
• Idea: find enough useful 
instruction sequences to allow 
for arbitrary computations
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Framework Overview
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Automated Gadget Construction
• CPU is register-based
 Start from working registers
• Constructs lists of gadgets being bound to working registers
• Gradually construct further lists by combining previous gadgets
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Load constant into register pop eax
Load memory variable mov eax, [ecx]
Store memory variable mov [edx], eax
Perform addition add eax, ecx
add eax, [edx+1337h]
